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Abstract 
Contemporary neuroscience theories assume that concepts are formed through experience in 
multiple sensory-motor modalities. Quantifying the contribution of each modality to different 
object categories is critical to understanding the structure of the conceptual system and to 
explaining category-specific knowledge deficits. Verbal feature listing is typically used to 
elicit this information but has a number of drawbacks: sensory knowledge often cannot easily 
be translated into verbal features and many features are experienced in multiple modalities. 
Here, we employed a more direct approach in which subjects rated their knowledge of objects 
in each sensory-motor modality separately. Compared with these ratings, feature listing over-
estimated the importance of visual form and functional knowledge and under-estimated the 
contributions of other sensory channels. An item’s sensory rating proved to be a better 
predictor of lexical-semantic processing speed than the number of features it possessed, 
suggesting that ratings better capture the overall quantity of sensory information associated 
with a concept. Finally, the richer, multi-modal rating data not only replicated the sensory-
functional distinction between animals and non-living things but also revealed novel 
distinctions between different types of artefact. Hierarchical cluster analyses indicated that 
mechanical devices (e.g., vehicles) were distinct from other non-living objects because they 
had strong sound and motion characteristics, making them more similar to animals in this 
respect. Taken together, the ratings align with neuroscience evidence in suggesting that a 
number of distinct sensory processing channels make important contributions to object 
knowledge. Multi-modal ratings for 160 objects are provided as supplementary materials. 
 
Keywords: object knowledge; semantic representation; sensory-functional theory; category-
specific deficits 
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Introduction 
 Semantic memory is our store of conceptual knowledge about the world, including the 
characteristics of objects, places and people and the meanings of words. Understanding the 
computational and neural structure of this information store is a key goal for cognitive 
neuroscience. Almost all contemporary theorists agree that the semantic system is at least 
partly distributed, with features specific to particular sensory modalities represented in areas 
close to those that perform the corresponding perceptual processing (Barsalou, 2008; Binder 
& Desai, 2011; Martin, 2007; Patterson, Nestor, & Rogers, 2007; Pulvermuller, 2001). This 
distributed knowledge theory can potentially account for the various patterns of category-
specific knowledge deficits found in neuropsychological patients (e.g., Capitani, Laiacona, 
Mahon, & Caramazza, 2003; Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Warrington & Shallice, 1984) and 
induced in healthy subjects following repetitive TMS (Pobric, Jefferies, & Lambon Ralph, 
2010) by assuming that different categories of object are associated with different types of 
perceptual experience and therefore depend on each modality-specific region to differing 
extents (Cree & McRae, 2003; Farah & McClelland, 1991; Mahon & Caramazza, 2009). This 
idea was first advanced by Warrington and Shallice (1984), who proposed that sensory 
characteristics were particularly important for distinguishing between living things, while 
functional information was central to the representation of artefacts (termed the sensory-
functional theory). 
 The sensory-functional dichotomy proved a popular framework for interpreting 
category-specific deficits but as it was investigated in more detail, it became clear that the 
explanatory power of the theory depended on precisely which types of information were 
classed as sensory and which as functional. Some researchers were concerned specifically 
with visual sensory information (Farah & McClelland, 1991), while others included tactile, 
auditory and gustatory modalities under the “sensory” umbrella (Devlin, Gonnerman, 
Andersen, & Seidenberg, 1998; Garrard, Lambon Ralph, Hodges, & Patterson, 2001). The 
definition of functional features proved equally pliable, with some restricting this to what an 
object is used for (Devlin, et al., 1998; Farah & McClelland, 1991), while others included 
behaviours an entity performed independently (e.g., owls can fly; Garrard, et al., 2001) or 
defined all non-sensory information as functional (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998). Others have 
argued that the key factor is not the function of an object but the motor acts involved in 
manipulating it (Martin, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 2000). These difficulties were compounded 
by problems in how multisensory features should be classified (discussed below). 
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 Going beyond the issue of feature classification, a number of authors have argued that 
a simple dichotomy of knowledge types is insufficient to account for the various patterns of 
category-specific impairment reported in the literature, and that a more fine-grained 
taxonomy of knowledge types is necessary to elucidate fully the structure of conceptual 
knowledge (Allport, 1985; Cree & McRae, 2003; Crutch & Warrington, 2003; Martin & 
Caramazza, 2003; Warrington & McCarthy, 1987). This assertion is supported by an ever-
growing neuroimaging literature, which indicates functional specialisation for processing 
object properties in different sensory channels. Processing an object’s visual characteristics 
activates ventral occipitotemporal cortex, even when subjects are presented with the object’s 
name rather a picture (Chao, Haxby, & Martin, 1999; Thompson-Schill, Aguirre, D'Esposito, 
& Farah, 1999). In contrast, auditory properties of objects are linked to activation in posterior 
superior temporal gyrus (Kiefer, Sim, Herrnberger, Grothe, & Hoenig, 2008; Lewis et al., 
2004), while somatosensory properties activate the post-central gyrus and gustatory 
information activates medial orbitofrontal cortex (Goldberg, Perfetti, & Schneider, 2006). 
Within the visual modality, there is evidence for further functional specialisation, with 
motion processing associated with the middle and superior temporal gyri (Beauchamp, Lee, 
Haxby, & Martin, 2002) while visual form and colour rely on the posterior fusiform (Martin, 
Haxby, Lalonde, Wiggs, & Ungerleider, 1995). Finally, knowledge of object manipulation is 
thought to be represented in the inferior parietal lobule, but appears to be neurally distinct 
from information about the object’s function (Buxbaum & Saffran, 2002; Ishibashi, Lambon 
Ralph, Saito, & Pobric, 2011; Kellenbach, Brett, & Patterson, 2003). Taken together, these 
findings indicate a complex pattern of neuroanatomical specialisation in object 
representation, which cannot be accounted for by a simple sensory-functional dichotomy. 
 To develop a comprehensive theory of conceptual knowledge representation and to 
reconcile the emerging neuroanatomical picture with the various forms of category-specific 
knowledge deficit, it is necessary to move beyond the broad sensory-functional distinction 
and towards a fine-grained understanding of which sensory-motor channels contribute to 
object knowledge, how they relate to one another, and how they differentially contribute to 
each category of object we encounter. Cree and McRae (2003) took an important first step in 
this direction by analysing the features of a large set of objects, using a taxonomy that 
distinguished between different types of visual and other sensory characteristics, as well as 
function knowledge. As with many other studies (Devlin, et al., 1998; Garrard, et al., 2001; 
Tyler, Moss, Durrant-Peatfield, & Levy, 2000; Vinson, Vigliocco, Cappa, & Siri, 2003; 
Zannino, Perri, Pasqualetti, Caltagirone, & Carlesimo, 2006), they used verbal features 
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generated by participants as the basis for their classification. Feature generation has proved to 
be a powerful tool in the study of object knowledge, with one of its key advantages being the 
ability to explore the degree to which objects share features with their category neighbours 
(Devlin, et al., 1998; Garrard, et al., 2001; Tyler, et al., 2000). While feature lists are ideally 
suited for some purposes, they may not give a complete picture of how knowledge is 
distributed amongst the various sensory-motor modalities available from our experience of 
the environment. There are three particular ways in which verbal feature lists may distort the 
true breadth of sensory-motor experience. 
1. Some features are not specific to a single modality. The features generated by subjects 
are classified post-hoc by researchers as being experienced in a particular sensory 
modality, yet many features are experienced in more than one. For example, subjects 
often say that objects are “made of metal”. This gives both visual and somatosensory 
information but such features are usually classed as visual features (Cree & McRae, 
2003). In another instance, suppose that a subject reports that a cat “has legs”. They 
may assume that, by giving this feature, they have implied that cats move by walking 
around and will fail to give this information explicitly. It would be an interpretive leap 
on the part of the investigator to assume that “having legs” is a motion feature (after 
all, tables have legs but rarely use them to move), so having legs is classified as visual 
form information and the motion knowledge that is part of the subject’s representation 
is not captured in their feature list.  
2. Feature listing is a verbal act. The task is biased towards modalities in which 
information can be easily expressed verbally. Detailed visual form information can be 
given, for example, by listing an object’s constituent parts. However, we have more 
limited vocabulary for describing tastes, sounds and so on, restricting the amount of 
information that can be expressed for these modalities. In particular, fine 
discriminations in modalities other than vision are often hard to describe (e.g., most 
people can distinguish between car and a truck on the basis of sound, but might have 
difficulty describing the difference verbally). This bias might distort the true nature of 
object knowledge in two ways. First, sensory modalities that are hard to verbalise may 
be under-represented in the database as a whole. Second, objects that are rich in 
verbalisable features may appear to be more strongly represented in the semantic 
system, relative to those that depend on other, less verbally-oriented modalities. 
3. Feature listing is a time-limited activity. Subjects are typically asked to produce up to 
10 features for each concept (e.g., McRae, Cree, Seidenberg, & McNorgan, 2005) or 
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are given a time-limit. This restricted window is not sufficient for subjects to express 
their sum total of knowledge for most items, so they are likely to focus on the most 
salient and distinctive information. This strategy could disadvantage particular 
sensory modalities because they are less salient. In addition, participants are likely to 
focus on information that distinguishes between, and are less likely to produce 
attributes that are shared across broad domains of item (Rogers et al., 2004). For 
example, nearly all animals have necks but this information is rarely listed, except for 
animals for which the neck is a particularly distinguishing feature (e.g., giraffe; 
Garrard, et al., 2001). The restriction in output also limits the usefulness of feature 
data for distinguishing between knowledge-rich items and those about which we 
know less. It is likely that more familiar items have richer and more detailed sensory-
motor representations than more unusual items but, when faced with a limited 
response window, subjects are likely to produce similar numbers of features for all 
items.  
  
In the Cree and McRae (2003) feature listing study, visual form and function information 
dominated the feature database. Although some other modalities were moderately important 
for narrow categories (e.g., colour features were often reported for fruits and vegetables), no 
other modalities were strongly represented across a broad range of items.
1
 Cree and McRae 
also noted that few features referred to motor acts and that their function features were mostly 
of the “what it’s for” variety. This might also have arisen from difficulty in expressing 
verbally how an object is manipulated, or an assumption that such information is conveyed 
implicitly when its function is described, rather than a dearth of such knowledge. So, while 
Cree and McRae’s (2003) study was an important advance in recognising the need for a more 
fine-grained taxonomy of sensory-motor knowledge, the range of knowledge expressed was 
limited by the verbal feature response format. 
 Two previous studies have explored an alternative approach to studying the sensory-
motor composition of object knowledge. Tranel et al. (1997) and Gainotti et al. (2009) asked 
participants to rate how strongly they associate items with information in each of a variety of 
sensory-motor modalities. This strategy avoids some of the pitfalls of feature listing. Because 
subjects express their knowledge in each domain directly, there is no need for post-hoc 
interpretation of what type of information is conveyed in each response. This also avoids the 
                                                 
1
 Encyclopaedic knowledge was also strongly represented in the feature data, but this is not discussed here as it 
is not clear whether this information can be mapped to a particular sensory-motor modality. 
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problem of ambiguous features that are experienced in multiple modalities. Ratings also 
allow subjects to express their level of knowledge without recourse to verbal features, thus 
removing the inherent bias towards visual information that can be verbalised easily. These 
previous studies suggested that a rich tapestry of sensory knowledge contributed to the 
representation of familiar objects, supporting a more fractionated view than the traditional 
sensory-functional dichotomy. However, neither study directly compared the information 
gleaned from ratings with verbal feature data. This is critical because all of the current 
incarnations of the sensory-functional theory depend heavily on results from feature 
generation, so a mismatch would motivate reconsideration of these theories. In the present 
study, we performed this direct comparison by collecting ratings of experience in various 
sensory-motor modalities for 160 items and comparing these with verbal features for the 
same items, as reported by McRae et al. (2005). Our goals were: 
1. to ascertain the extent to which ratings and feature lists provided convergent information 
about the relative importance of each sensory-motor modality for object knowledge. 
2. to determine whether ratings and features provided the same distribution of knowledge 
across modalities for living vs. non-living things. 
3. to assess how categories grouped together in terms of their dependence on particular 
modalities, and whether this similarity structure differed for features vs. ratings. 
4. to compare the information given by ratings and feature lists about the overall quantity of 
sensory-motor information available for individual objects, by comparing their ability to 
predict latencies in word and picture naming tasks. 
 
 Previous studies have indicated that verbal feature listing emphasises the importance 
of an object’s visual form and function, because these qualities are easy to verbalise. In 
contrast, when rating sensory experiences directly, we expected relatively greater weight to 
be given to other sensory modalities, consistent with the neuroanatomical evidence for 
specialised regions for representing sound, motion, somatosensory and gustatory knowledge. 
As a result, we expected ratings to capture more accurately the full breadth of sensory-motor 
knowledge available for particular object concepts, making the ratings a better predictor of 
performance in visual word and picture recognition than the feature database. We explored 
the distribution of knowledge in different object categories to ascertain the extent to which 
our data supported the expected sensory-functional distinction between animals and 
manmade artefacts. 
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 Although this is not the first study to probe conceptual knowledge through ratings of 
experience in particular modalities, this is the first time that the ratings method has been 
compared with the dominant feature generation paradigm directly. In addition, we made one 
important deviation from the method used in previous rating studies (Gainotti, et al., 2009; 
Tranel, et al., 1997). In these studies, stimuli were presented in pictorial form, potentially 
biasing subjects towards giving higher ratings for visual qualities. In contrast, we presented 
items as written words. We provide the ratings for all 160 concepts in Supplementary 
Materials and hope that these will be useful for researchers in their own studies. 
 
Method 
 Participants: 101 undergraduate students took part (mean age = 19.4 years). Data from 
one subject was excluded due to failure to follow task instructions. 
 Stimuli: 160 living and non-living objects were selected for rating. 152 items were 
taken from the McRae et al. (2005) feature listing norms (the remaining eight items were 
used to ensure overlap with our clinical testing materials and are not discussed further here). 
Items were selected to ensure a broad range of animals, plants, manipulable objects and other 
non-living items were included (see Appendix for a full list). Items were presented as written 
words for rating. Where words were judged to be potentially ambiguous, they were presented 
with a disambiguating cue (e.g., orange (fruit)). 
 Procedure: Each item was rated for its overall familiarity and for its strength of 
association with eight sensory-motor modalities. The modalities were those identified by 
Cree and McRae (2003) based on the neuroscientific literature. Three referred to different 
aspects of visual experience (colour, visual form and observed motion), four to other sensory 
experiences (sound, taste, smell and tactile sensation) and the final one to performed actions. 
The action category differed slightly from Cree and McRae’s taxonomy, whose final category 
was function. We chose to ask about actions rather than functions because actions are closely 
tied to physical experience while functions are a broader class that can include verbally-
mediated encyclopaedic knowledge. However, when re-analysing McRae et al.’s (2005) 
feature norms, we retained their original classification of functions because there were few 
features that referred specifically to actions.  
 Ratings were collected through an online questionnaire which subjects completed at 
their convenience. Before beginning, they were given descriptions of each sensory modality 
with examples of objects displaying qualities in that modality. They were then presented with 
a worked example of how they might rate the item door (for full task instructions see 
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Supplementary Materials). Subjects were asked “How much do you associate this item with a 
particular colour?” (and visual form, motion and so on). We asked about strength of 
association because we wanted to capture not just whether a particular modality is 
experienced for an item, but also the degree of consistency in this experience across 
exemplars. For example, whenever one walks through a door its colour is experienced, but 
since this experience varies greatly with each exemplar (i.e., different doors can be painted in 
different colours), colour is unlikely to play an important part in the general concept. In 
contrast, strawberries are always associated with the same colour experience, so colour is 
likely to be central to their conceptual representation. Between these extremes, there are cases 
for which there is a degree of variability in the experience but a clear central tendency (e.g., 
horses can be white, grey or black, but are most often brown). We assumed that by asking 
about the strength of association with each modality, subjects would consider where each 
concept fell on this continuum. All ratings were completed on a seven-point scale, with 1 
indicating “not at all” and 7 “very strongly”. The nine ratings for each item were completed 
on a single webpage, with the item’s name shown at the top of the page.  
 Design: Each item was rated by 20 subjects in total. Each item was assigned to four of 
20 unique sets of 32 items and each subject received one of these sets of 32 items to rate. This 
procedure ensured that no two items were rated by the same 20 individuals. The full set of 
ratings is available as Supplementary Materials. 
 
Results 
 
What is the overall distribution of knowledge across different modalities? 
 We began by averaging results across all objects and comparing the mean ratings for 
each modality with the number of features assigned to each modality in the McRae et al. 
(2005) feature norms (see Figure 1). There was some similarity between the two datasets in 
the general pattern of information across modalities. Visual form was the dominant modality 
in both datasets, followed by function/action. In contrast, smell and taste were given low 
ratings and were associated with few features because these modalities are only relevant for a 
minority of items. Though this basic pattern was present for both datasets, there was clear 
divergence in terms of the relative contribution of each modality. Feature lists were strongly 
dominated by visual form (and, to a lesser extent, function) knowledge, with fewer than one 
feature per concept being produced in the other modalities. In contrast, there was a more 
balanced distribution across modalities in the ratings data, suggesting a richer multimodal 
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distribution of knowledge. This interpretation was supported by a 2 x 8 within-items 
ANOVA, which revealed an interaction between dataset and modality (F(7,1057) = 56.5, p < 
0.001). The discrepancy was largest for motion and colour information.  
 Figure 2 provides a more detailed picture of each modality in the form of histograms. 
Ratings and feature lists give similar distributions in some modalities. For example, no taste 
or smell features were present for most concepts in the feature norms and the ratings also 
indicated that these modalities were usually unimportant, with the majority of concepts 
receiving ratings between 1 and 2. In other cases there were conflicting results, illustrated 
most clearly in the colour modality. In the feature norms, no colour information was present 
for over half of the concepts tested. The absence of colour features for so many items 
suggests that colour may not play a major part in the representation of many familiar items. 
However, when asked to rate colour knowledge specifically, subjects indicated that most 
items were quite strongly associated with particular colours, with the median rating between 
4 and 5 and very few concepts in the lowest 1-2 range. A similar discrepancy was present for 
motion and, to a lesser extent, sound and tactile information. Thus, while the feature norms 
provide no evidence for the role of these modalities in the representation of many common 
objects, people often report having such knowledge when asked to rate it specifically. There 
were some striking examples of this problem at the level of individual concepts. For example, 
in the McRae et al. norms there are no motion features associated with the concept bus, 
indicating that of the 30 subjects presented with this concept, fewer than five reported 
explicitly that it could move. In contrast, when we asked subjects how much they associated 
bus with a particular kind of motion, they rated it very highly (6.25 out of 7). Clearly, 
subjects were aware that buses move in a particular way when providing their features, but 
may have felt they expressed this information implicitly when describing its visual 
appearance (“has wheels”) or function (“used for transportation”). In general, these findings 
support the notion that the feature listing biases subjects towards giving visual form and 
function knowledge and misses other sensory information that is available when probed more 
directly. 
  
How does each modality contribute to knowledge of living and non-living things? 
  Next we investigated the contribution of different types of knowledge to different 
classes of objects. To compare ratings with feature data directly, we needed to take into 
account the fact that they were measured on different scales and that the bias towards visual 
form information was much stronger in the feature data. Accordingly, we expressed each 
11 
concept’s mean rating/number of features in each modality as a z-score relative to all 
concepts. Figure 3 shows the mean z-scores for creatures and artefacts.
2
 Having accounted 
for the general bias towards visual form information in the feature data, ratings and feature 
listing demonstrated both important similarities and differences with regard to the relative 
importance of different sensory modalities to the two types of concept. Both agreed that 
artefacts were associated with greater function/action knowledge and that creatures were 
more likely to be associated with particular colours and types of motion. In the ratings data, 
smells and tastes were also more strongly associated with creatures but this was not observed 
in the feature data, perhaps because smell and taste features were produced for very few 
items. We compared the distributions for each measure with a 2 x 2 x 8 ANOVA that 
included dataset, concept domain (creatures vs. artefacts) and modality as factors. This 
revealed main effects of modality (F(7,847) = 7.34, p < 0.001) and domain (F(1,121) = 4.64, 
p < 0.05) and an interaction between them (F(7,847) = 31.8, p < 0.001). Most importantly, 
there was a 3-way interaction between these two factors and dataset (F(7,847) = 7.53, p < 
0.001), indicating that the ratings and feature listing gave different conclusions regarding the 
relationship between modality and concept domain. Post-hoc tests revealed that the two 
datasets gave different results in the modalities of motion and taste (motion: F(1,121) = 32.0, 
p < 0.001; taste: F(1,121) = 8.89, p < 0.01). Taste information did not discriminate between 
creatures and artefacts in the feature data while it did in the ratings (because subjects reported 
having taste information about edible creatures in the ratings but did not provide this 
information in feature listing). Feature lists highlighted a larger discrepancy for motion 
information than did the ratings, perhaps indicating that feature lists underestimate the 
relevance of motion information for artefacts. 
 
 
How do categories group together based on ratings vs. feature data? 
 Feature listing studies often employ hierarchical cluster analyses in order to elucidate 
the structure of semantic knowledge (Cree & McRae, 2003; Garrard, et al., 2001; Rogers, et 
al., 2004). Such analyses typically reveal a tri-partite organisation of knowledge, with three 
major clusters emerging that distinguish between creatures, artefacts and fruits and 
vegetables. This corresponds to the three major forms of category-specific semantic 
                                                 
2
 Following Cree and McRae (2003), we use the term “creatures” to refer to all animate living things and 
“artefacts”  to refer to manmade objects. However, we excluded musical instruments, foods and fruit/plants 
from this analysis as they were identified by Cree and McRae (2003) as “salient exceptions” to the usual 
living/non-living distinction. 
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impairment found in the neuropsychological literature (Capitani, et al., 2003). Here, we 
performed a hierarchical cluster analysis on our modality ratings, following the method used 
by Cree and McRae (2003). These authors placed individual concepts into higher-level 
categories and performed the analysis on average data for each category. We followed this 
approach, using Cree and McRae’s classification to assign concepts to categories.3 We then 
performed a hierarchical cluster analysis of the categories, based on the mean ratings for each 
modality and using the average-linkage between-groups method and cosine distance measure.  
 The dendrogram in Figure 4A indicates that there were four major clusters. The 
earliest split produced a cluster of four categories, which all contained edible items. Another 
cluster contained all of the remaining creature categories. Non-living things appeared in two 
distinct clusters. One was entirely separate from the creatures and edible items while the 
other patterned at a late stage with the creatures. We refer to this second non-living cluster as 
“mechanical devices” (it also includes musical instruments). This division amongst non-
living things was not expected on the basis of the tri-partite distinction discussed above. For 
comparison, we performed a cluster analysis on the feature listing data for categories derived 
from the same 152 concepts (see Figure 4B). These data did yield a tri-partite structure, with 
all of the non-living items in a single cluster, indicating that the fractionation of non-living 
things generated by the ratings method is a novel observation. It should also be noted that in 
the feature data the fruits and plants did not cluster with the foods, presumably because taste 
and smell information is less salient in the feature database. Musical instruments are also 
distinct from all other non-living items in the feature data, while they appear in a larger 
cluster in the ratings-based dendrogram. One possibility for this difference is that sound 
information is only rarely produced in feature listing, and at a much higher rate for musical 
instruments than for any other category. Therefore musical instruments are highly distinctive 
in the feature database. 
 To investigate the basis of the four clusters and, in particular, the reason for the 
separation of mechanical devices from the other artefacts, we performed a principal 
components analysis on the ratings for all categories. A four-factor solution accounted for 
93% of the variance. The varimax-rotated solution is shown in Table 1 and reveals patterns of 
co-occurence between modalities. Factor 1 loads heavily on both taste and smell, as expected 
because these two modalities are often experienced together. Factor 2 is associated 
                                                 
3
 Our set of concepts included no exemplars of the category “roots/tubers”. We also omitted six categories for 
which we had fewer than three exemplars, though similar results were obtained when these categories were 
included. 
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principally with sound and motion, presumably because items that move are also likely to 
make sounds. Factor 3 combines two key aspects of visual experience: colour and visual 
form. Factor 4 is associated with action and tactile information, which are jointly experienced 
through object manipulation. 
 For each cluster of concepts in Figure 4A, we calculated its loading on the four factors 
by averaging values from the individual categories that comprised the cluster (see Table 2). 
The edible cluster loaded heavily on Factor 1 only, reflecting the importance of taste and 
smell to these items. The main artefact cluster loaded most heavily on Factor 4 (praxis), 
supporting the notion that action/function knowledge is critical for non-living things. 
Creatures loaded equally on two factors: sound/motion and vision. This indicates that 
creatures are associated with a variety of sensory characteristics. Finally, the mechanical 
devices did not fit neatly with either the creatures or the other artefacts: they loaded with the 
creatures on Factor 2 (sound/motion) but, like the other non-living items, also loaded heavily 
on the praxis factor. This suggests that these items depend on a wide range of sensory-motor 
information. Examination of the categories in this cluster supports this idea. Like other non-
living objects they can be manipulated but critically the cluster includes objects that move 
(e.g., machinery), make distinctive sounds (e.g., appliances like radio, telephone; and musical 
instruments) or both (vehicles). Since most other artefact categories do not move or make 
sounds but creatures often do, mechanical devices clustered loosely with the creatures in the 
dendrogram. It is important to note that this clustering does not imply that creatures and 
mechanical devices move in similar ways or make similar sounds, because we did not collect 
data on the specific content of the information in each modality. It merely indicates that the 
modalities of sound and motion, and potentially the neural regions associated with them, are 
of similar importance to both types of concept. This novel result was not present in the 
feature listing data because feature listing underestimates the importance of sound and motion 
knowledge in conceptual representation (see Figure 2) and, in particular, underestimates the 
amount of motion information we have about non-living things (Figure 3). 
 
Can the amount of sensory-motor knowledge associated with an item predict how quickly its 
name is recognised or produced? 
 One way of testing the validity of information gleaned from feature listing and ratings 
is to test their ability to predict speed of processing in lexical-semantic tasks. It is well-
established that concepts with richer semantic representations benefit from a processing 
advantage (e.g., concrete relative to abstract words; Degroot, 1989; James, 1975; Plaut & 
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Shallice, 1993). Therefore, if feature listings and ratings data accurately reflect the total 
amount of sensory-motor knowledge we have about particular items, we would expect these 
measures to successfully predict speed of lexical access in semantic processing tasks. Indeed, 
Pexman et al. (2008) found that the number of features in McRae et al.’s (2005) database was 
a significant predictor of latencies in visual lexical decision and semantic categorisation 
tasks. The names of objects associated with a greater number of features were recognised and 
categorised more quickly than those with fewer features. Here, we tested whether our sensory 
ratings could predict lexical-semantic processing efficiency in a similar way, and how its 
predictive power compared with that of McRae et al.’s feature database. We explored these 
factors using data from two standard behavioural tasks: visual lexical decision data from the 
English Lexicon project (Balota et al., 2007) and picture naming data collected in our lab. 
 Measures of sensory richness: For the ratings data, we simply took an object’s mean 
rating across all eight modalities as a measure of the overall strength of its sensory-motor 
representation. This is of course not the only way in which one could calculate an average. It 
could be argued that modalities that receive consistently high ratings (e.g., visual form) 
contribute more strongly to the representations and should be weighted more strongly when 
averaging, but in the absence of a strong theoretical motivation to do this, we opted instead 
for a simple average. From the feature database, we used the total number of features listed 
for each item to represent the amount of information associated with it. Following Pexman et 
al. (2008), we excluded taxonomic features from the total. 
 Visual word recognition: Reaction times for visual lexical decision (z-scores) were 
available for 150 items in the English Lexicon Project database (Balota, et al., 2007). These 
were analysed using a hierarchical multiple regression model. In the first step of the 
regression, we entered a number of variables known to influence lexical decision: word 
length, log word frequency (from the CELEX database; Baayen, Piepenbrock, & van Rijn, 
1993), item familiarity (from our ratings) and orthographic Levenshtein distance, a measure 
of the density of a word’s orthographic neighbourhood (Yarkoni, Balota, & Yap, 2008). In 
the second step, we added number of features to determine whether this variable could 
account for any additional variance in latencies. In a final third step, we added the mean 
sensory ratings to determine whether these had any additional predictive power beyond that 
provided by the number of features. 
 Picture naming: Reaction times in picture naming were collected from 17 students at 
the University of Manchester (mean age = 22) as part of a separate study. Participants named 
131 of the items. Pictures were obtained from the International Picture Naming Project 
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(Szekely et al., 2004) and presented on 15-inch computer monitor. No time limit was placed 
on responses, though participants were asked to respond as quickly as possible. Reaction 
times were recorded with an electronic voice-key, with responses scored online and recorded 
for later verification. A three-step hierarchical regression model was computed from the data. 
The first step included number of syllables, number of phonemes, log word frequency and 
item familiarity. Number of features was entered in the second step and mean sensory rating 
in the third step. 
 Results: The correlation matrix for lexical decision variables is given in Table 3. Note 
that both the mean sensory ratings and the number of features were strongly correlated with 
familiarity, consistent with the idea that we have more detailed representations of items we 
encounter regularly in our environment. The regression results are presented in Table 4. The 
initial psycholinguistic variables were able to account for more than 50% of the variance in 
lexical decision latencies; however, both sensory measures made an additional, independent 
contribution beyond this. In line with Pexman et al.’s (2008) results, including number of 
features significantly improved the fit of the model. The inclusion of sensory ratings 
improved the model still further and the beta values indicated that this variable, rather than 
number of features, was the stronger predictor. This conclusion was supported by a second 
regression model in which sensory ratings were entered in the second step and number of 
features in the third. In this model, sensory ratings boosted the R
2
 of the model significantly 
(ΔR2 = .024; F(1,143) = 8.46, p = 0.004), but the subsequent inclusion of number of features 
led to no significant improvement in the model (ΔR2 = .006; F(1,142) = 2.29, p = 0.13).  
 Correlations for picture naming variables are shown in Table 5 and the corresponding 
regression results in Table 6. The initial variables accounted for around 14% of the variance 
in this case. Addition of number of features did not improve the model significantly, though 
subsequent inclusion of the sensory ratings did. As with lexical decision, a second model was 
computed with the order of entry of the two semantic variables reversed. Including sensory 
ratings led to a significant improvement in the regression model (ΔR2 = .05; F(1,125) = 7.85, 
p = 0.006), while the later addition of number of features had no effect (ΔR2 = .007; F(1,124) 
= 1.10, p = 0.3).  
It is important to note that although these two datasets originated on opposite sides of 
the Atlantic (our ratings were collected in the UK and McRae et al.’s (2005) feature data in 
North America), this difference is unlikely to account for these results. The danger is that 
there could be substantial cultural differences in experience with particular objects, which 
could potentially explain why our ratings were a better predictor of our UK-based picture 
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naming data. However, ratings were also a better predictor of the American lexical decision 
data, arguing against this interpretation. 
 
General Discussion 
 It is widely accepted that a number of modality-specific neural processing regions 
contribute to semantic representation (Barsalou, 2008; Martin, 2007; Patterson, et al., 2007; 
Pulvermuller, 2001; Warrington & Shallice, 1984). We investigated the relative contributions 
of each sensory-motor modality to different object concepts by collecting ratings of modality-
specific knowledge; and we compared these data to those generated from verbal feature 
listing. The main findings can be summarised as follows: 
1. Ratings and feature listing gave partly divergent information about the relative 
contributions of different sensory-motor modalities. Both highlighted the central role 
of visual form and function/action knowledge for object concepts, but ratings gave 
greater weight to other modalities, most notably motion and colour information, that 
were not strongly represented in the verbal feature database. 
2. Both datasets supported established broad differences between creatures and artefacts, 
with function/action knowledge particularly central for artefacts and aspects of vision 
(colour and motion) key to creature knowledge. 
3. At a more fine-grained level, the two datasets gave differing conclusions about which 
types of object rely on similar modalities. Hierarchical clustering based on the 
modalities of features revealed a tri-partite structure that neatly divided creatures, 
plants and artefacts. While a similar basic structure was present in the ratings data, 
there was one important deviation: mechanical devices did not cluster with other 
artefacts and instead shared greater similarity with creatures. Further investigation 
revealed that mechanical devices partially overlapped with both creatures and 
artefacts. In common with other artefacts, they were strongly associated with praxis 
but, like creatures, they relied heavily on sound and motion information. This novel 
observation was not present in the feature-based data because sound and motion 
features were under-represented in these data. 
4. When used to predict latencies in picture naming and lexical decision, a concept’s 
mean rating was a better predictor than the number of features it had. This suggests 
that the ratings technique better captures the overall quantity of sensory-motor 
knowledge available for each concept. 
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 This work has implications for theories of conceptual representation and for 
understanding category-specific knowledge deficits. Category-specific deficits have 
traditionally been explained in terms of a dichotomous model that distinguishes between 
sensory and functional knowledge stores (Farah & McClelland, 1991; Martin, et al., 2000; 
Warrington & Shallice, 1984). However, there has been growing acceptance that a dichotomy 
cannot easily explain the various patterns of spared and impaired categories reported in 
category-specific patients (Allport, 1985; Cree & McRae, 2003; Crutch & Warrington, 2003; 
Martin & Caramazza, 2003; Warrington & McCarthy, 1987). Moreover, rapidly 
accumulating neuroimaging evidence points to greater fractionation within the systems for 
representing sensory knowledge, with distinct activations for different aspects of visual 
experience, as well as for auditory, somatosensory, praxic and gustatory knowledge 
(Beauchamp, et al., 2002; Goldberg, et al., 2006; Kiefer, et al., 2008; Lewis, et al., 2004; 
Martin, et al., 1995). However, while this evidence now indicates finer distinctions between 
the neural systems involved in storing different forms of sensory knowledge, investigations 
of the composition of object knowledge, predominately based on verbal feature listing, have 
mostly retained the original dichotomous division between sensory and functional knowledge 
(Devlin, et al., 1998; Garrard, et al., 2001; Tyler, et al., 2000; Zannino, et al., 2006). 
Although some attempts have been made to develop a more fine-grained approach, most 
notably by Cree and McRae (2003), the success of these endeavours has been limited because 
the feature listing paradigm does not lend itself to capturing the full range of sensory 
experience available to us. By dispensing with verbal features and probing each modality 
more directly, we have uncovered a richer pattern of sensory knowledge, in which a number 
of sensory-motor channels support conceptual knowledge of common objects. This provides 
further, convergent support for the idea that sensory knowledge is best understood as an 
amalgamation of a number of distinct processing channels, rather than a single homogeneous 
store of information. 
 One novel observation produced by the present study is the finding that mechanical 
devices (including vehicles, machines, electrical appliances and musical instruments) 
occupied a middle ground between artefacts and creatures. Like other artefacts, these items 
were associated with action knowledge, but in common with creatures, they were also linked 
with sound and motion knowledge. This suggests that concepts in the mechanical devices 
cluster have a widely distributed semantic representation involving regions important for 
representations of animals as well as for non-living items. Due to this distributed 
representation, we might expect relative preservation of these concepts, even when 
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knowledge of other non-living things is impaired. Is there any evidence for this in the 
category-specific literature? We should note first of all that many studies have treated non-
living things as a single category and in studies which have distinguished between more fine-
grained categories, key confounding variables such as concept familiarity have often not been 
adequately controlled (see Capitani, et al., 2003). Despite these caveats, there are some cases 
of patients with non-living deficits who showed relatively preserved knowledge of vehicles. 
Warrington and McCarthy’s (1987) patient YOT showed poor comprehension of manipulable 
objects but more intact knowledge of large artefacts, many of which were vehicles, and 
similar results were observed in KE (Hillis, Rapp, Romani, & Caramazza, 1990) and GP 
(Cappa, Frugoni, Pasquali, Perani, & Zorat, 1998). It is also known that musical instruments 
sometimes pattern with living rather than non-living things (Dixon, Piskopos, & Schweizer, 
2000; Gainotti & Silveri, 1996; Warrington & Shallice, 1984).
4
 Based on the available 
evidence, it seems that mechanical devices and musical instruments are best treated as 
overlapping partially with creatures and partially with other non-living things. Our results 
suggest caution is warranted in treating manmade artefacts as a single homogeneous category 
and that the assertion that artefacts depend uniformly on action or function knowledge over-
simplifies a complex situation.  
 The other main contribution of this study is to compare the predictive power of the 
rating vs. feature listing paradigms. The ratings data proved a better predictor of reaction 
times in two lexical-semantic tasks, suggesting that ratings give a more accurate indication of 
the overall quantity of sensory-motor information associated with a particular concept. This is 
consistent with our assertion that verbal features under-represent the amount of knowledge 
available in some modalities. In contrast, asking subjects to report their level of knowledge in 
each modality explicitly ensures that the full breadth of sensory-motor experience is sampled. 
We should note, however, that feature lists have a number of other advantages that ratings 
lack. The ratings method gives information about the strength of representation across 
modalities, but no information about the content of the representations. Conversely, feature 
lists give more detailed information about precisely what we know about objects, which can 
then be used to construct computational models (Devlin, et al., 1998; Rogers, et al., 2004; 
Tyler, et al., 2000) and to design experiments that probe conceptual reasoning (Cree, 
McNorgan, & McRae, 2006; McNorgan, Reid, & McRae, 2011). Important insights 
regarding the ratio of shared to distinctive properties have also been derived from feature lists 
                                                 
4
 To our knowledge, no studies have examined the status of appliances or machines as specific categories. 
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(Cree & McRae, 2003; Garrard, et al., 2001), whereas our ratings method does not capture 
this aspect of conceptual representation. In sum, we see feature listing and ratings collection 
as complementary methods for elucidating the structure of conceptual knowledge. Ratings 
methods are suited to investigating how knowledge is distributed across sensory modalities, 
while feature lists provide deeper insights into the precise content of this knowledge. 
 Although this is the first study to compare the ratings method with feature generation 
directly, two previous studies have reported sensory experience ratings of the type collected 
here. Tranel et al. (1997) collected ratings of experience in vision, sound and touch, as well as 
characteristic motion, as part of a broader study of the factors that differ between object 
categories. In line with our findings, vision ratings were higher than those in other modalities. 
There was also some overlap with our findings with respect to mechanical devices. Musical 
instruments and vehicles both received higher sound ratings than other artefacts. In addition, 
principal components analysis revealed a factor associated with high sound ratings and it 
appeared that some creatures loaded heavily on this factor, as well as musical instruments. 
Motion ratings were also collected but these are harder to interpret because Tranel et al. asked 
specifically about motion involved in using an item. This excluded the biological motion that 
our study revealed as integral to creature concepts. 
 Gainotti et al. (2010) collected ratings for a number of concepts that included the 
main sensory processing channels in addition to praxis knowledge and linguistic knowledge. 
They also found that visual experience was the dominant form of sensory information 
(though this was not sub-divided into colour, form and motion, as it was in the present study). 
Although their categories were only partially overlapping with ours, there were some striking 
similarities. The only mechanical devices included were vehicles and, as in the present study, 
these were the only class of artefacts for auditory information was considered important. 
Gainotti et al. also conducted a hierarchical clustering analysis. Direct comparison with our 
results is difficult because Gainotti et al. included a number of “unique entities” categories 
that we did not test. However, it is interesting to note that their cluster analysis placed 
vehicles in a different cluster to other artefact categories, in a cluster that also contained wild 
animals. There is convergent evidence, therefore, that vehicles are something of an oddity 
within the domain of artefacts. 
 This study has demonstrated that people are able to retrieve rich, multi-sensory 
information about objects when this information is probed directly. An important outstanding 
question is the degree to which this information is activated automatically whenever the 
concept is encountered, or whether activation of modality-specific knowledge only occurs 
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when it is probed explicitly or is directly relevant to the task at hand. Functional imaging 
studies indicate that modality-specific brain regions can be activated even when they are not 
explicitly involved in the task. For example, objects with strong auditory properties 
selectively activate superior temporal regions involved in auditory perception, even when 
they were presented as written words in a lexical decision task (Kiefer, et al., 2008). 
Similarly, passive reading of action words activates areas of premotor cortex in a somatotopic 
manner (Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermuller, 2004). Other studies indicate that activity in these 
modality-specific regions actively contributes to processing. Recent studies have used 
transcranial magnetic stimulation to explore the function of the inferior parietal lobule, an 
area associated with object manipulation knowledge (Kellenbach, et al., 2003). Stimulation to 
this region slows judgements of object manipulation in healthy participants (Ishibashi, et al., 
2011), but has also been shown to produce selective slowing of manipulable objects in a 
picture naming task for which manipulation knowledge was not probed directly (Pobric, et 
al., 2010). Similarly, apraxic patients with parietal lobe lesions perform very poorly when 
questioned about how tools are manipulated, but they also show milder tool-specific deficits 
in other semantic tasks that do not directly require manipulation knowledge (Buxbaum & 
Saffran, 2002). In addition, van Dam et al. (in press) recently demonstrated that the degree of 
inferior parietal activation elicited by action-related objects is affected by task, being greatest 
when people made judgements about the action used to interact with the object. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that involvement of modality-specific brain regions in 
semantic processing is a graded phenomenon that depends on (a) the intrinsic relevance of the 
modality to the representation of the concept and (b) the importance of the modality to the 
current context or task. 
 Throughout this study, we have focused on sensory-motor knowledge gained through 
direct interaction with the environment. There is little doubt that language also plays a critical 
role in the formation of concepts (e.g., Landauer & Dumais, 1997) and that emotional states 
may be an important additional source of information, particularly for abstract concepts that 
have no direct physical referents (Barsalou, 2008). There also remains considerable debate 
over whether this network of specialised regions is sufficient by itself to represent conceptual 
knowledge or whether an additional integrative system is necessary to combine these 
different sources of information into modality-invariant concepts (Barsalou, 2008; Martin, 
2007; Patterson, et al., 2007; Rogers, et al., 2004). The hub-and-spoke framework (Rogers, et 
al., 2004) is an example of the latter view, inspired by studies of semantic dementia patients 
whose semantic deficit affects all categories of knowledge to a similar extent (Lambon Ralph, 
21 
Lowe, & Rogers, 2007). If conceptual knowledge were simply the summation of activity in 
distributed modality-specific areas, these patients would need to have damage to a number of 
anatomically distinct regions in order to for all concepts to be affected. In fact, their 
pathology is homogenous and focussed on the inferior, anterior temporal lobes, which are not 
associated with any specific modality (Galton et al., 2001; Mion et al., 2010). The hub-and-
spoke model instead attributes their pan-categorical, pan-modal deficit to damage to a central 
conceptual hub and indicates that the category-specific deficits of other patient groups arise 
from damage to one or more of the modality-specific “spokes” (Pobric, et al., 2010). 
Understanding how these two elements of semantic representation interact is an important 
challenge for future research. 
  
22 
References 
Allport, D. A. (1985). Distributed memory, modular systems and dysphasia. In S. K. 
Newman & R. Epstein (Eds.), Current perspectives in dysphasia (pp. 32-60). 
Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone. 
Baayen, R. H., Piepenbrock, R., & van Rijn, H. (1993). The CELEX lexical database (CD-
ROM). Philadelphia, PA: Linguistic Data Consortium, University of Pennsylvania. 
Balota, D. A., Yap, M. J., Cortese, M. J., Hutchison, K. A., Kessler, B., Loftis, B., et al. 
(2007). The English Lexicon Project. Behavior Research Methods, 39(3), 445-459. 
Barsalou, L. W. (2008). Grounded Cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 617-645. 
Beauchamp, M. S., Lee, K. E., Haxby, J. V., & Martin, A. (2002). Parallel visual motion 
processing streams for manipulable objects and human movements. Neuron, 34(1), 
149-159. 
Binder, J. R., & Desai, R. H. (2011). The neurobiology of semantic memory. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 15(11), 527-536. 
Buxbaum, L. J., & Saffran, E. M. (2002). Knowledge of object manipulation and object 
function: dissociations in apraxic and nonapraxic subjects. Brain and Language, 
82(2), 179-199. 
Capitani, E., Laiacona, M., Mahon, B., & Caramazza, A. (2003). What are the facts of 
semantic category-specific deficits? A critical review of the clinical evidence. 
Cognitive Neuropsychology, 20(3-6), 213-261. 
Cappa, S. F., Frugoni, M., Pasquali, P., Perani, D., & Zorat, F. (1998). Category-specific 
naming impairment for artefacts: A new case. Neurocase, 4(4-5), 391-397. 
Caramazza, A., & Shelton, J. R. (1998). Domain-specific knowledge systems in the brain: 
The animate-inanimate distinction. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 10(1), 1-34. 
Chao, L. L., Haxby, J. V., & Martin, A. (1999). Attribute-based neural substrates in temporal 
cortex for perceiving and knowing about objects. Nature Neuroscience, 2(10), 913-
919. 
Cree, G. S., McNorgan, C., & McRae, K. (2006). Distinctive features hold a privileged status 
in the computation of word meaning: Implications for theories of semantic memory. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology-Learning Memory and Cognition, 32(4), 643-+. 
Cree, G. S., & McRae, K. (2003). Analyzing the factors underlying the structure and 
computation of the meaning of chipmunk, cherry, chisel, cheese, and cello (and many 
other such concrete nouns). Journal of Experimental Psychology-General, 132(2), 
163-201. 
23 
Crutch, S. J., & Warrington, E. K. (2003). The selective impairment of fruit and vegetable 
knowledge: A multiple processing channels account of fine-grain category specificity. 
Cognitive Neuropsychology, 20(3-6), 355-372. 
Degroot, A. M. B. (1989). Representational aspects of word imageability and word frequency 
as assessed through word association. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning 
Memory and Cognition, 15(5), 824-845. 
Devlin, J. T., Gonnerman, L. M., Andersen, E. S., & Seidenberg, M. S. (1998). Category-
specific semantic deficits in focal and widespread brain damage: A computational 
account. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 10(1), 77-94. 
Dixon, M. J., Piskopos, M., & Schweizer, T. A. (2000). Musical instrument naming 
impairments: The crucial exception to the living/nonliving dichotomy in category-
specific agnosia. Brain and Cognition, 43(1-3), 158-164. 
Farah, M. J., & McClelland, J. L. (1991). A Computational model of semantic memory 
impairment: Modality specificity and emergent category specificity. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 120(4), 339-357. 
Gainotti, G., Ciaraffa, F., Silveri, M. C., & Marra, C. (2009). Mental representation of normal 
subjects about the sources of knowledge in different semantic categories and unique 
entities. Neuropsychology, 23(6), 803-IV. 
Gainotti, G., & Silveri, M. C. (1996). Cognitive and anatomical locus of lesion in a patient 
with a category-specific semantic impairment for living beings. Cognitive 
Neuropsychology, 13(3), 357-&. 
Galton, C. J., Patterson, K., Graham, K., Lambon-Ralph, M. A., Williams, G., Antoun, N., et 
al. (2001). Differing patterns of temporal atrophy in Alzheimer's disease and semantic 
dementia. Neurology, 57(2), 216-225. 
Garrard, P., Lambon Ralph, M. A., Hodges, J. R., & Patterson, K. (2001). Prototypicality, 
distinctiveness, and intercorrelation: Analyses of the semantic attributes of living and 
nonliving concepts. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 18(2), 125-174. 
Goldberg, R. F., Perfetti, C. A., & Schneider, W. (2006). Perceptual knowledge retrieval 
activates sensory brain regions. Journal of Neuroscience, 26(18), 4917-4921. 
Hauk, O., Johnsrude, I., & Pulvermuller, F. (2004). Somatotopic representation of action 
words in human motor and premotor cortex. Neuron, 41(2), 301-307. 
Hillis, A. E., Rapp, B., Romani, C., & Caramazza, A. (1990). Selective impairment of 
semantics in lexical processing. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 7(3), 191-243. 
24 
Ishibashi, R., Lambon Ralph, M. A., Saito, S., & Pobric, G. (2011). Different roles of lateral 
anterior temporal lobe and inferior parietal lobule in coding function and 
manipulation tool knowledge: Evidence from an rTMS study. Neuropsychologia, 49, 
1128-1135. 
James, C. T. (1975). The role of semantic information in lexical decisions. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 104, 130-136. 
Kellenbach, M. L., Brett, M., & Patterson, K. (2003). Actions speak louder than functions: 
The importance of manipulability and action in tool representation. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 15(1), 30-46. 
Kiefer, M., Sim, E. J., Herrnberger, B., Grothe, J., & Hoenig, K. (2008). The Sound of 
Concepts: Four Markers for a Link between Auditory and Conceptual Brain Systems. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 28(47), 12224-12230. 
Lambon Ralph, M. A., Lowe, C., & Rogers, T. T. (2007). Neural basis of category-specific 
semantic deficits for living things: Evidence from semantic dementia, HSVE and a 
neural network model. Brain, 130, 1127-1137. 
Landauer, T. K., & Dumais, S. T. (1997). A solution to Plato's problem: The latent semantic 
analysis theory of acquisition, induction and representation of knowledge. 
Psychological Review, 104, 211-240. 
Lewis, J. W., Wightman, F. L., Brefczynski, J. A., Phinney, R. E., Binder, J. R., & DeYoe, E. 
A. (2004). Human brain regions involved in recognizing environmental sounds. 
Cerebral Cortex, 14, 1008-1021. 
Mahon, B. Z., & Caramazza, A. (2009). Concepts and Categories: A Cognitive 
Neuropsychological Perspective. Annual Review of Psychology, 60, 27-51. 
Martin, A. J. (2007). The representation of object concepts in the brain. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 58, 25-45. 
Martin, A. J., & Caramazza, A. (2003). Neuropsychological and neuroimaging perspectives 
on conceptual knowledge: An introduction. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 20(3-6), 195-
212. 
Martin, A. J., Haxby, J. V., Lalonde, F. M., Wiggs, C. L., & Ungerleider, L. G. (1995). 
Discrete cortical regions associated with knowledge of color and knowledge of action. 
Science, 270, 102-105. 
Martin, A. J., Ungerleider, L. G., & Haxby, J. V. (2000). Category-specificity and the brain: 
The sensory/motor model of semantic representations of objects. In M. S. Gazzaniga 
25 
(Ed.), The cognitive neurosciences (2nd ed., pp. 1023-1036). Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
McNorgan, C., Reid, J., & McRae, K. (2011). Integrating conceptual knowledge within and 
across representational modalities. Cognition, 118(2), 211-233. 
McRae, K., Cree, G. S., Seidenberg, M. S., & McNorgan, C. (2005). Semantic feature 
production norms for a large set of living and nonliving things. Behavior Research 
Methods, 37(4), 547-559. 
Mion, M., Patterson, K., Acosta-Cabronero, J., Pengas, G., Izquierdo-Garcia, D., Hong, Y. 
T., et al. (2010). What the left and right fusiform gyri tell us about semantic memory. 
Brain, 133, 3256-3268. 
Patterson, K., Nestor, P. J., & Rogers, T. T. (2007). Where do you know what you know? The 
representation of semantic knowledge in the human brain. Nature Reviews 
Neuroscience, 8(12), 976-987. 
Pexman, P. M., Hargreaves, I. S., Siakaluk, P. D., Bodner, G. E., & Pope, J. (2008). There are 
many ways to be rich: Effects of three measures of semantic richness on visual word 
recognition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 15(1), 161-167. 
Plaut, D. C., & Shallice, T. (1993). Deep dyslexia: A case study in connectionist 
neuropsychology. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 10, 377-500. 
Pobric, G., Jefferies, E., & Lambon Ralph, M. A. (2010). Category-specific vs. category-
general semantic impairment induced by transcranial magnetic stimulation. Current 
Biology, 20, 964-968. 
Pulvermuller, F. (2001). Brain reflections of words and their meaning. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 5, 517-524. 
Rogers, T. T., Lambon Ralph, M. A., Garrard, P., Bozeat, S., McClelland, J. L., Hodges, J. 
R., et al. (2004). Structure and deterioration of semantic memory: A 
neuropsychological and computational investigation. Psychological Review, 111(1), 
205-235. 
Szekely, A., Jacobsen, T., D'Amico, S., Devescovi, A., Andonova, E., Herron, D., et al. 
(2004). A new on-line resource for psycholinguistic studies. Journal of Memory and 
Language, 51(2), 247-250. 
Thompson-Schill, S. L., Aguirre, G. K., D'Esposito, M., & Farah, M. J. (1999). A neural 
basis for category and modality specificity of semantic knowledge. 
Neuropsychologia, 37, 671-676. 
26 
Tranel, D., Logan, C. G., Frank, R. J., & Damasio, A. R. (1997). Explaining category related 
effects in the retrieval of conceptual and lexical knowledge for concrete entities: 
operationalization and analysis of factors. Neuropsychologia, 35(10), 1329-1339. 
Tyler, L. K., Moss, H. E., Durrant-Peatfield, M. R., & Levy, J. P. (2000). Conceptual 
structure and the structure of concepts: A distributed account of category-specific 
deficits. Brain and Language, 75(2), 195-231. 
Van Dam, W. O., van Dijk, M., Bekkering, H., & Rueschemeyer, S. (in press). Flexibility in 
embodied lexical-semantic representations. Human Brain Mapping. 
Vinson, D. P., Vigliocco, G., Cappa, S., & Siri, S. (2003). The breakdown of semantic 
knowledge: Insights from a statistical model of meaning representation. Brain and 
Language, 86(3), 347-365. 
Warrington, E. K., & McCarthy, R. A. (1987). Categories of knowledge: Further 
fractionations and an attempted integration. Brain, 110, 1273-1296. 
Warrington, E. K., & Shallice, T. (1984). Category specific semantic impairments. Brain, 
107, 829-854. 
Yarkoni, T., Balota, D., & Yap, M. (2008). Moving beyond Coltheart's N: A new measure of 
orthographic similarity. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 15(5), 971-979. 
Zannino, G. D., Perri, R., Pasqualetti, P., Caltagirone, C., & Carlesimo, G. A. (2006). 
Analysis of the semantic representations of living and nonliving concepts: A 
normative study. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 23(4), 515-540. 
 
  
  
27 
Table 1: Principal components analysis of ratings data 
 Factor 1: 
Taste/Smell 
Factor 2: 
Sound/Motion 
Factor 3: 
Vision 
Factor 4: 
Praxis 
Colour .478 .127 .718 -.433 
Visual form .074 .090 .950 .060 
Motion -.315 .836 .290 -.025 
Sound -.168 .910 -.089 .242 
Taste .943 -.209 .186 -.035 
Smell .931 -.276 .111 -.056 
Tactile .470 -.358 .517 .525 
Action -.096 .252 -.057 .934 
 
Factor loadings are shown in bold if greater than 0.4. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Mean factor scores for each cluster of concepts 
Clusters Factor 1: 
Taste/Smell 
Factor 2: 
Sound/Motion 
Factor 3: 
Vision 
Factor 4: 
Praxis 
Creatures -0.27 0.58 0.54 -0.66 
Mechanical devices -0.02 1.30 -0.64 1.17 
Other non-living -0.64 -1.04 -0.45 0.34 
Edible 1.99 -0.67 0.19 -0.20 
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Table 3: Correlations between lexical decision variables 
 
Variable 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. Reaction time .52*** .57*** .64*** -.63*** -.45*** -.37*** -.33*** 
2. Number of syllables -- .78*** .80*** .39*** -.11 -.11 .03 
3. Word length  -- .88*** -.40*** -.08 -.12 .01 
4. Levenshtein distance   -- -.48*** -.20* -.19* -.10 
5. Word frequency (log)    -- .57** .35*** .20* 
6. Familiarity     -- .38*** .55*** 
7. Number of features      -- .38*** 
8. Sensory rating       -- 
* = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Results of hierarchical regression analysis on lexical decision RTs 
 
Predictor B Standard 
error 
β R2 ΔR2 
Initial step    .572*** .572*** 
Second step (Number of features)  .586*** .013* 
Third step (Sensory rating)  .603*** .017* 
Number of syllables .018 .034 .049   
Word length .020 .017 .140   
Levenshtein distance .091 .040 .286*   
Word frequency (log) -.171 .042 -.302***   
Familiarity -.020 .020 -.082   
Number of features -.009 .006 -.091   
Sensory rating -.077 .032 -.166*   
* = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001. 
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Table 5: Correlations between picture naming predictors 
 
Predictor 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Reaction time .15 .24** -.28** -.32*** -.26** -.35*** 
2. Number of syllables -- .83*** -.38*** -.09 -.09 .07 
3. Number of phonemes  -- .45** -.17 -.18* -.08 
4. Word frequency (log)   -- .55*** .31*** .13 
5. Familiarity    -- .29** .47*** 
6. Number of features     -- .33*** 
7. Sensory rating      -- 
* = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001. 
 
 
 
Table 6: Results of hierarchical regression analysis on naming RTs 
 
Predictor B Standard 
error 
β R2 ΔR2 
Initial step    .147*** .147*** 
Second step (Number of features)  .167*** .019 
Third step (Sensory rating)  .205*** .038* 
Number of syllables -10.0 35.5 -.042   
Number of phonemes 20.9 18.1 .177   
Word frequency (log) -40.3 41.3 -.107   
Familiarity -17.6 20.2 -.095   
Number of features -6.6 6.3 -.093   
Sensory rating -78.4 32.1 -.239*   
* = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001. 
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Figure 1: Mean ratings and number of features produced in each modality 
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Figure 2: Distribution of ratings and number of features in each modality 
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Figure 3: Levels of knowledge across modalities for creatures and non-living things 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* indicates a significant difference between creatures and non-living things (p < 0.05). 
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Figure 4: Dendrograms produced by hierarchical cluster analysis of each dataset 
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Appendix: List of 160 Items Presented for Rating 
 
Creatures: alligator, ant, buzzard, camel, cat, caterpillar, catfish, chicken, cockroach, cod, 
cow, dog, duck, eagle, eel, elephant, flea, frog, goldfish, hornet, horse, hyena, kangaroo, 
mackerel, monkey, moth, mouse, octopus, ostrich, owl, peacock, penguin, platypus, rabbit, 
rhinoceros, salmon, sardine, spider, squid, squirrel, swan, tiger, trout, turtle, walrus, worm 
 
Non-living things: aeroplane, axe, barn, barrel, basket, bazooka, bed, beehive, bike, 
bin_(waste), blender, bomb, bookcase, boots, bouquet, brick, bridge, brush, bus, cabinet, 
candle, cathedral, chandelier, clock, coat, comb, cottage, crane_(machine), crossbow, desk, 
dishwasher, earmuffs, emerald, envelope, escalator, glass_(drinking), gun, hammer, 
helicopter, house, kettle, key, lantern, machete, mirror, motorcycle, oven, paintbrush, pier, 
pliers, plug_(electric), pyramid, radio, rocket_(machine), saw_(tool), scissors, screwdriver, 
shawl, shelves, skirt, skyscraper, sledge, socks, sofa, spanner, spear, stool_(furniture), 
subway, suitcase, sword, table, tank_(army), telephone, tent, thermometer, toaster, 
toothbrush, train, trousers, truck, typewriter, unicycle, veil, wand, watering can 
 
Musical Instruments: bagpipe, clarinet, drum, guitar, harpsichord, piano, tuba, violin 
 
Plants and Natural Kinds: banana, cherry, dandelion, oak, orange_(fruit), pear, pine_(tree), 
pineapple, seaweed, stick, stone, strawberry, tomato 
 
Food: biscuit, bread, cake, cheese, pickle, pie 
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Online Supplementary Materials: Instructions to Subjects 
 
This is a study about what kinds of information come to mind when we think about different 
objects. Objects are associated with a variety of sensory information but different senses are 
important for different objects. For example, banana is strongly associated with a particular 
colour and taste and bell with a particular type of sound.  
 
You will be presented with a series of entities (man-made objects, animals and plants) and 
asked to rate how much you associate each one with different kinds of sensory experience, on 
a scale of 1 to 7. You will also be asked how familiar you are with the entity. Below is a list 
of the types of sensory experience you will be asked about. On the following screen is an 
example of how you might rate these for a specific object. Please read through these 
instructions carefully. 
 
You will be asked how much you associate each item with a particular: 
 
Colour – for example, apples are typically green or red and post boxes are always red 
 
Visual form – the shape of an object and how different components make up its appearance. 
For example, giraffes have a distinctive visual form with legs, long neck and so on and oak 
trees have a particular shape. 
 
Observed motion – the movements you can see a particular entity make. For example, the 
characteristic hopping motion of a toad or the movement of the hands on a clock 
 
Sound – for example, alarm clocks are associated with ringing sounds and cows with mooing 
 
Smell – for example, a rose has a distinctive smell and a rubbish bin might be associated with 
an unpleasant smell 
 
Taste – for example, chocolate and sausages have distinctive tastes  
 
Tactile sensation – information gained by feeling or touching an entity. For example, the 
feeling of a dog’s fur or the texture of sandpaper 
 
Performed action – movements you make when you interacting with the entity. For 
example, a cat might be associated with the physical action of stroking or a corkscrew with 
the action of twisting 
 
Below is an example of the ratings you will be asked to make for each item. The text in red is 
designed to help you understand how these ratings were made. This text will not appear 
during the actual test.  
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Doors are highly familiar objects that we encounter many times every day 
Doors come in a variety of colours so are not strongly associated with a particular colour 
Doors typically have a characteristic rectangular shape with a handle at one side 
They are associated with the motion of swinging open and shut 
You might think of creaking or slamming noises, but these sounds do not come to mind very easily 
so are more weakly associated 
As we do not associate doors with particular smells or tastes these senses receive very low ratings 
Doors could be associated with a smooth flat surface but again this does not come to mind easily 
when we think about them 
Doors are strongly associated with the physical action of turning the handle and pushing 
37 
Beginning on the next screen, you will be asked to make these kinds of ratings for a series of 
items. Feel free to work through the items fairly quickly, but please spend a little time 
thinking about each item before rating it. 
 
There will be 32 items in total. Occasionally items could refer to more than one kind of object 
and in these cases it will be made clear which object you should think about (e.g., 
bat_(animal) or bat_(baseball)). 
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Supplementary material: Ratings for 160 items 
 
McRae et al.? indicates whether the item  was present in the McRae et al. (2005) feature 
norms. Items that were not present were not included in analyses. 
Mean ratings give the average values across the 20 subjects who rated each item. 
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aeroplane Yes 6.60 5.10 6.75 6.30 5.85 1.45 2.50 2.30 5.00 
alligator Yes 4.00 6.00 6.40 4.65 2.50 1.05 1.15 2.45 3.00 
ant Yes 5.65 5.50 6.00 5.40 1.30 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.30 
apple Yes 6.95 6.35 6.70 3.20 2.50 6.70 5.65 5.00 4.11 
axe Yes 4.55 3.75 6.05 4.35 2.45 1.20 1.20 2.65 5.15 
bagpipe Yes 3.75 3.80 5.70 4.50 6.70 1.00 1.00 2.20 5.25 
banana Yes 6.90 6.90 6.85 3.80 1.55 6.75 6.30 4.90 4.90 
barn Yes 5.25 4.75 5.45 2.80 2.35 1.20 3.85 2.35 2.85 
barrel Yes 5.10 5.25 6.25 2.40 1.15 1.00 1.35 2.55 2.90 
basket Yes 5.85 4.20 5.95 2.30 1.70 1.25 1.50 3.60 4.30 
bazooka Yes 1.95 2.05 3.25 1.95 2.85 1.00 1.05 1.60 3.35 
bed Yes 7.00 3.00 6.45 2.80 1.85 1.10 1.70 4.60 4.95 
beehive Yes 3.95 4.25 5.70 2.80 5.60 1.05 1.25 1.80 3.20 
bike Yes 6.70 3.30 6.00 6.00 3.55 1.00 1.10 3.40 6.00 
bin_(waste) Yes 6.45 3.90 5.15 3.00 1.50 1.00 5.05 2.40 4.40 
biscuit Yes 6.85 4.65 5.50 2.60 1.95 6.10 4.85 3.55 3.45 
blender Yes 5.80 3.45 5.40 5.60 6.35 1.25 1.40 3.05 5.75 
bomb Yes 3.10 2.80 3.45 3.55 5.40 1.05 1.65 1.85 4.45 
bookcase Yes 6.55 4.95 6.05 3.15 1.20 1.20 1.55 3.45 3.60 
boots Yes 6.75 4.00 5.60 3.95 2.80 1.10 1.75 3.85 5.65 
bouquet Yes 6.55 4.85 5.65 1.85 1.15 1.00 6.05 3.80 2.35 
bread Yes 6.95 5.85 6.15 2.70 1.85 6.60 6.32 5.00 4.55 
brick Yes 6.45 5.85 6.35 3.40 1.95 1.10 1.30 4.30 4.15 
bridge Yes 6.45 3.05 5.65 2.50 1.30 1.05 1.10 2.45 4.45 
brush Yes 6.90 3.90 5.80 4.60 2.60 1.32 1.35 3.35 4.90 
bus Yes 6.95 4.90 6.40 6.25 5.28 1.00 2.40 2.90 5.30 
buzzard Yes 3.00 2.75 3.20 4.00 3.63 1.10 1.30 2.00 3.20 
cabinet Yes 6.10 4.00 5.30 3.05 1.80 1.10 1.60 2.75 3.45 
cake Yes 6.85 4.30 5.65 1.85 1.05 6.55 6.05 4.60 3.70 
camel Yes 5.10 6.30 6.60 5.30 3.10 1.20 2.35 3.00 4.05 
candle Yes 6.60 4.55 6.20 3.85 1.70 1.45 5.05 3.85 5.15 
cat Yes 6.85 4.15 6.65 5.90 6.58 1.10 3.45 4.95 4.75 
caterpillar Yes 5.75 5.50 6.20 5.25 1.50 1.20 1.20 2.75 2.85 
catfish Yes 2.75 2.60 3.70 3.00 1.05 1.15 1.40 1.70 2.35 
cathedral Yes 4.80 3.25 5.45 1.50 2.95 1.00 1.20 1.55 2.40 
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chandelier Yes 4.85 4.45 5.70 2.60 2.00 1.00 1.00 2.45 3.75 
cheese Yes 6.85 5.85 5.40 1.50 1.05 6.15 6.00 3.60 2.45 
cherry Yes 6.45 6.84 6.75 3.05 1.20 6.35 5.25 4.35 3.90 
chicken Yes 6.40 5.85 6.58 5.05 5.15 6.10 5.25 3.65 4.05 
clarinet Yes 5.25 5.35 5.85 3.15 5.75 1.05 1.10 2.95 4.70 
clock Yes 6.85 3.55 5.80 6.10 5.50 1.30 1.25 2.65 5.30 
coat Yes 7.00 3.60 5.75 3.10 1.40 1.00 1.60 4.60 5.35 
cockroach Yes 5.00 5.90 6.20 5.55 2.75 1.00 1.35 2.85 3.20 
cod Yes 5.25 4.60 5.45 3.20 1.35 5.30 4.55 3.30 3.05 
comb Yes 6.45 3.70 6.35 4.00 1.53 1.15 1.15 3.90 5.55 
cottage Yes 5.05 3.37 5.30 1.60 1.10 1.00 1.89 1.95 2.70 
cow Yes 6.40 6.05 6.63 5.05 5.90 3.75 4.20 3.30 4.25 
crane_(machine) Yes 4.25 4.50 5.45 5.10 3.80 1.05 1.05 2.50 4.60 
crossbow Yes 2.70 2.45 4.85 4.70 2.30 1.00 1.00 2.10 5.10 
dandelion Yes 5.75 6.45 6.80 3.40 1.15 1.37 3.85 4.26 3.40 
desk Yes 6.75 4.75 5.95 2.90 1.16 1.00 1.05 3.80 4.15 
dishwasher Yes 6.25 4.65 5.80 4.70 5.65 1.15 2.16 2.75 5.40 
dog Yes 6.85 3.40 5.60 5.45 6.25 1.05 4.25 5.26 4.70 
drum Yes 6.50 2.95 6.30 4.45 6.80 1.05 1.05 3.45 5.90 
duck Yes 6.05 5.55 6.50 5.20 6.30 3.30 2.20 3.05 3.00 
eagle Yes 4.85 4.60 6.05 5.85 3.90 1.00 1.05 2.05 3.05 
earmuffs Yes 5.25 2.85 6.00 3.05 1.40 1.05 1.15 4.80 4.45 
eel Yes 4.60 5.55 6.00 5.00 1.25 1.55 1.60 3.00 3.05 
elephant Yes 5.85 6.70 6.75 5.30 5.45 1.35 2.15 3.15 3.35 
emerald Yes 4.05 6.40 5.15 1.35 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.25 1.55 
envelope Yes 6.85 5.75 6.65 3.65 1.85 3.80 1.75 3.95 5.35 
escalator Yes 6.50 4.85 6.35 6.50 3.10 1.00 1.00 3.50 5.85 
flea Yes 3.35 4.10 4.65 4.15 1.65 1.00 1.15 2.00 3.70 
frog Yes 5.10 6.10 6.25 5.35 5.60 1.15 1.40 3.55 3.45 
glass_(drinking) No 6.95 5.35 6.05 3.79 2.74 1.75 1.35 4.50 6.00 
goldfish Yes 6.00 6.65 6.60 5.70 2.55 1.05 1.95 2.35 3.45 
guitar Yes 5.95 4.80 6.40 4.90 6.75 1.00 1.05 4.05 6.10 
gun Yes 4.40 4.60 6.10 4.45 5.70 1.05 1.35 2.85 4.95 
hammer Yes 5.55 4.05 6.30 5.05 5.30 1.00 1.00 3.40 5.70 
harpsichord Yes 1.95 1.75 2.95 2.25 3.60 1.00 1.00 2.20 3.25 
helicopter Yes 5.25 4.05 6.00 5.70 6.30 1.05 1.40 2.42 4.45 
hornet Yes 3.60 3.90 4.70 4.20 4.40 1.00 1.05 1.80 2.55 
horse Yes 6.00 4.95 6.32 5.75 5.65 1.05 3.60 4.80 5.20 
house Yes 6.95 3.70 5.40 2.40 1.60 1.20 2.25 2.20 3.20 
hyena Yes 3.55 4.70 5.35 4.05 4.65 1.00 1.00 1.80 2.75 
kangaroo No 4.05 5.70 6.20 5.85 1.90 1.15 1.20 2.50 3.70 
kettle Yes 6.95 4.60 6.37 3.95 5.65 1.35 1.85 3.65 5.65 
key Yes 6.90 4.65 6.65 3.95 2.95 1.10 1.10 3.60 6.00 
lantern Yes 4.85 3.45 4.95 3.50 1.35 1.10 1.55 2.50 4.60 
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machete Yes 3.05 3.35 5.45 4.45 2.25 1.05 1.05 3.00 4.90 
mackerel Yes 4.95 4.15 5.05 3.65 1.45 5.15 5.70 3.45 2.95 
mirror Yes 6.65 5.55 6.10 4.15 1.25 1.05 1.40 4.21 4.90 
monkey No 5.00 5.10 6.00 5.20 6.05 1.05 1.70 1.95 3.55 
moth Yes 5.35 4.55 5.70 5.40 2.90 1.25 1.45 2.05 3.05 
motorcycle Yes 5.85 2.70 6.05 6.25 6.58 1.32 2.95 2.90 5.25 
mouse Yes 5.10 5.65 6.40 5.05 5.15 1.20 1.90 2.75 3.95 
oak Yes 5.30 5.55 5.53 3.05 2.20 1.10 2.10 3.50 2.45 
octopus Yes 4.20 4.35 6.05 3.79 1.30 1.90 1.50 2.60 2.55 
orange_(fruit) Yes 6.90 6.95 6.84 3.85 1.80 6.85 6.68 4.75 4.95 
ostrich Yes 4.85 4.95 6.15 4.45 2.21 1.15 1.25 2.47 3.26 
oven Yes 6.85 3.90 5.85 4.15 3.65 1.45 3.70 3.05 5.60 
owl Yes 4.70 4.65 6.00 5.45 5.90 1.10 1.10 2.60 2.85 
paintbrush Yes 6.30 3.65 6.35 5.25 1.50 1.00 2.70 4.65 6.05 
peacock Yes 4.65 6.20 6.60 4.35 3.05 1.00 1.15 2.25 3.00 
pear Yes 6.80 6.25 6.35 2.40 1.15 6.45 4.65 4.20 3.70 
penguin Yes 5.35 6.45 6.60 5.60 3.90 1.00 1.30 1.75 3.05 
piano Yes 6.25 5.00 6.05 4.37 6.60 1.05 1.30 4.45 5.75 
pickle Yes 5.50 5.70 5.75 1.40 1.45 5.75 5.60 3.42 3.10 
pie Yes 6.35 4.55 5.65 2.60 1.30 6.35 6.00 3.70 3.05 
pier Yes 4.60 3.10 5.55 1.95 2.30 1.35 2.40 1.95 2.45 
pine_(tree) Yes 4.70 5.60 5.65 2.60 1.50 1.10 3.00 3.50 2.50 
pineapple Yes 6.30 6.60 6.84 2.60 1.35 6.85 5.50 5.50 3.65 
platypus Yes 2.45 3.30 3.95 3.15 1.25 1.00 1.00 1.65 2.35 
pliers Yes 4.65 3.95 6.05 4.10 1.55 1.11 1.25 3.50 5.50 
plug_(electric) Yes 6.80 5.25 6.05 3.55 1.50 1.00 1.15 3.75 4.80 
pyramid Yes 5.05 5.75 6.65 2.15 1.15 1.05 1.45 2.10 1.90 
rabbit Yes 6.60 4.40 6.15 5.65 2.55 1.30 2.20 4.85 4.00 
radio Yes 6.65 3.00 4.85 2.90 6.75 1.00 1.05 2.15 4.80 
rhinoceros No 4.20 5.95 6.30 4.11 2.80 1.05 1.70 2.10 2.75 
rocket_(machine) Yes 4.45 3.60 5.80 5.30 5.45 1.05 1.75 2.10 4.30 
salmon Yes 5.10 6.10 5.65 3.05 1.25 5.35 5.40 3.16 3.00 
sardine Yes 4.00 4.45 4.85 3.00 1.15 3.90 4.85 2.70 2.60 
saw_(tool) No 5.35 3.45 6.10 4.63 4.80 1.00 1.55 3.50 5.40 
scissors Yes 6.85 4.65 6.35 4.85 3.85 1.05 1.05 4.10 5.75 
screwdriver Yes 5.95 4.05 6.30 4.85 1.60 1.00 1.00 3.45 5.95 
seaweed Yes 5.00 6.35 6.20 3.25 1.50 2.15 3.95 4.60 2.60 
shawl Yes 5.45 2.05 5.10 2.45 1.05 1.00 1.25 3.75 3.90 
shelves Yes 6.70 4.20 6.15 2.60 1.30 1.05 1.15 2.95 4.05 
skirt Yes 6.55 2.50 5.90 2.45 1.05 1.20 1.05 3.85 3.35 
skyscraper Yes 5.15 4.00 6.10 2.00 1.15 1.00 1.10 1.74 1.90 
sledge Yes 5.80 3.55 5.95 5.85 2.20 1.00 1.05 3.25 5.50 
socks Yes 6.80 4.00 6.10 4.55 1.65 1.10 3.05 5.00 5.20 
sofa Yes 6.80 3.40 6.10 3.30 1.50 1.00 1.60 4.50 4.10 
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spanner Yes 5.05 5.00 5.90 3.85 2.00 1.00 1.05 3.95 5.40 
spear Yes 3.55 2.65 4.30 3.50 2.00 1.30 1.25 2.65 3.65 
spider Yes 6.75 6.00 6.50 6.10 2.00 1.30 1.35 3.63 3.70 
squid Yes 3.60 4.00 4.80 2.50 1.21 3.40 3.15 2.85 2.45 
squirrel Yes 5.10 5.60 6.35 4.90 3.45 1.15 1.10 2.10 3.00 
stick Yes 6.15 6.05 5.80 2.80 2.25 1.05 1.65 4.20 2.75 
stone Yes 6.40 4.95 5.05 2.15 2.20 1.00 1.20 4.65 2.75 
stool_(furniture) Yes 5.60 4.30 6.00 3.40 1.65 1.15 1.30 3.60 4.75 
strawberry Yes 6.75 6.95 6.80 3.00 1.65 6.80 6.00 5.55 4.90 
subway Yes 4.35 3.10 4.85 4.47 4.15 1.05 2.60 2.20 4.40 
suitcase No 6.25 3.75 5.85 4.10 2.53 1.05 1.50 3.40 4.85 
swan Yes 6.00 6.75 6.75 5.05 3.85 1.10 1.25 2.15 3.55 
sword Yes 3.75 4.50 5.85 4.70 2.75 1.00 1.15 2.95 5.10 
table Yes 6.90 4.55 6.60 2.65 1.50 1.05 1.20 3.70 4.10 
tank_(army) Yes 4.45 5.45 5.80 5.45 4.10 1.00 1.20 1.75 4.05 
telephone Yes 6.95 3.20 5.80 3.90 6.25 1.00 1.00 3.55 6.05 
tent Yes 5.60 4.20 5.75 3.30 1.65 1.15 1.55 3.70 4.50 
thermometer Yes 6.15 4.60 6.15 3.45 1.00 1.00 1.00 3.20 5.30 
tiger Yes 5.05 6.45 6.40 5.25 5.45 1.05 1.10 3.05 3.15 
toaster Yes 6.75 4.35 6.20 5.05 4.95 2.15 4.30 3.25 5.40 
tomato Yes 6.80 6.90 6.85 2.68 1.25 6.15 4.85 4.35 3.70 
toothbrush No 7.00 3.10 6.55 5.65 4.65 5.00 2.85 5.80 6.55 
train Yes 6.65 3.75 6.45 6.55 6.00 1.00 2.05 2.75 5.75 
trousers Yes 6.80 3.70 6.25 3.10 1.10 1.10 1.30 3.75 4.15 
trout Yes 4.20 4.10 4.90 3.65 1.40 3.40 4.00 2.90 2.95 
truck Yes 5.40 3.60 5.80 5.85 5.25 1.05 1.55 2.55 4.75 
tuba Yes 3.10 5.05 5.40 3.70 5.55 1.10 1.10 2.90 4.65 
turtle Yes 5.25 5.80 6.10 4.90 2.00 1.20 1.25 2.75 3.00 
typewriter Yes 4.85 4.25 5.60 4.25 5.25 1.15 1.10 2.70 5.25 
unicycle Yes 3.95 1.80 6.30 5.70 1.90 1.16 1.15 2.40 5.60 
veil Yes 4.45 4.75 5.45 2.55 1.10 1.25 1.25 2.85 3.00 
violin Yes 5.70 5.55 6.55 4.45 6.80 1.00 1.35 3.15 5.10 
walrus Yes 3.20 4.95 5.60 3.70 2.85 1.10 1.50 2.74 2.20 
wand Yes 3.80 3.30 5.90 4.35 1.75 1.05 1.05 2.25 4.55 
watering_can No 5.75 4.30 6.00 4.15 2.20 1.00 1.05 2.50 5.85 
willow Yes 4.05 4.50 5.15 2.85 1.80 1.05 1.50 2.35 2.45 
worm Yes 5.95 5.80 6.20 5.15 1.15 1.16 1.05 3.65 2.90 
 
